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WHEN IS A FELONY A FELONY? AUTOMATIC
DISBARMENT IN NEW YORK AFTER IN RE
JOHNSTON*
INTRODUCTION
Section 90(4) of the New York Judiciary Law provides that
an attorney who is convicted of a felony is automatically dis-
barred.1 The determination of whether an offense is a felony for
purposes of the statute depends, in part, on whether the offense
is committed in New York. When an attorney is convicted of a
criminal offense under New York law, the application of section
90(4) is straightforward: an offense constitutes a felony if it is
classified as such under the laws of New York.2 When an attor-
ney is convicted of an offense under the laws of a foreign juris-
diction,s however, the application of section 90(4) is more com-
plicated. Under such circumstances, an offense constitutes a
felony for purposes of the statute only if it is classified as a fel-
ony under the law of the jurisdiction in which it is committed,
and, were it committed in New York, it would constitute a fel-
ony under New York law.4 The New York Court of Appeals has
* 75 N.Y.2d 403, 553 N.E.2d 566, 554 N.Y.S.2d 88 (1990).
Section 90(4)(a) provides in relevant part:
Any person being an attorney and counsellor-at-law who shall be convicted
of a felony as defined in paragraph e of this subdivision, shall upon such con-
viction, cease to be an attorney and counsellor-at-law, or to be competent to
practice law as such.
N.Y. Jun. LAw § 90(4)(a) (McKinney 1983).
2 Section 90(4)(e) provides:
For purposes of this subdivision, the term felony shall mean any criminal
offense classified as a felony under the laws of this state or any criminal offense
committed in any other state, district, or territory of the United States and
classified as a felony therein which if committed within this state, would con-
stitute a felony in this state.
N.Y. Jun. LAW § 90(4)(e) (McKinney 1983).
This part of the statute was added by amendment in 1979. For further discussion,
see text accompanying notes 87-93 infra.
3 Throughout this Comment, the term "foreign," when used in a discussion pertain-
ing to the criminal offenses of another jurisdiction, will refer to the laws of any state,
district, or territory of the United States other than New York, or to federal law and the
criminal offenses defined thereunder.
4 N.Y. Jun. LAW § 90(4)(e). See note 2 supra for the text of this provision.
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interpreted section 90(4) to mean that a felony committed in a
foreign jurisdiction need not be a mirror image of a New York
felony; rather, a foreign felony need only be "essentially similar"
to a New York felony.'
The court of appeals recently confronted the difficult prob-
lem of determining when a felony conviction in a foreign juris-
-diction requires automatic disbarment in New York. In In re
Johnston," the court focused on the issue of whether an attor-
ney's conviction of involuntary manslaughter in Texas, for kill-
ing another while driving under the influence of alcohol, consti-
tuted a felony within the meaning of section 90(4). The court
concluded that it did not. It found that the Texas felony would
not constitute a felony in New York, were it committed in New
York, despite the existence of the New York felony of vehicular
manslaughter. Instead of holding that Johnston was automati-
cally disbarred as a result of her Texas felony conviction, the
court remitted the matter for a disciplinary hearing.7 In so hold-
-In re Johnston, 75 N.Y.2d 403, 406, 553 N.E.2d 566, 567, 554 N.Y.S.2d 88, 89
(1990); In re Margiotta, 60 N.Y.2d 147, 150, 456 N.E.2d 798, 799, 468 N.Y.S.2d 857, 858
(1983); In re Cahn, 52 N.Y.2d 479, 482, 420 N.E.2d 945, 946, 438 N.Y.S.2d 753, 754
(1981).
75 N.Y.2d 403, 553 N.E.2d 566, 554 N.Y.S.2d 88 (1990).
Id. Under § 90(4), a foreign felony that does not constitute a felony under New
York law constitutes a "serious crime." N.Y. JuD. LAW § 90(4) (McKinney 1983). Section
90(4)(d) provides in relevant part:
For purposes of this subdivision, the term serious crime shall mean any
criminal offense denominated a felony under the laws of any state, district or
territory or of the United States which does not constitute a felony under the
laws of this state ....
Id.
An attorney convicted of a "serious crime" must be suspended; but the appellate
division may set aside the suspension if it deems it appropriate to do so. Id. § 90(4)(f).
When the judgment of conviction becomes final, the convicted attorney must show cause
why a final order of censure, suspension, or disbarment by the appellate division should
not be made. Id. § 90(4)(g). But if the attorney so requests (as he or she virtually always
will), the appellate division will refer the matter for a disciplinary hearing at which the
attorney can present mitigating circumstances in his or her defense; however, he or she
cannot relitigate the issue of guilt. Id. § 90(4)(h); see Maltz, Impact of Criminal Convic-
tion on the Right to Practice Law, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 28, 1990, at 1, col. 1. In the first
department, this hearing is conducted before a panel composed of members of the De-
partmental Disciplinary Committee (DDC). Id. After the hearing, the panel makes a re-
port and a recommendation to the appellate division of the appropriate discipline to be
imposed. N.Y. Jun. LAW § 90(4)(h). The appellate division can accept or reject the recom-
mendation and will impose such discipline as it deems proper under the circumstances.
Id.
Thus the consequences of conviction of a foreign felony that constitutes only a "seri-
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ing, the court substantially narrowed its "essential similarity"
test for determining when the commission of a foreign felony
will constitute a felony under section 90(4). The court's decision
suggests that it will now be significantly less likely that an attor-
ney convicted of a foreign felony will be subject to automatic
disbarment in New York.
This Comment analyzes the court of appeals's decision in
Johnston. First, this Comment discusses the development and
application of the court's essential similarity test. Second, this
Comment demonstrates that the court significantly narrowed its
test for essential similarity; it now requires a substantially
stricter identity of elements between foreign and New York felo-
nies. Third, this Comment closely examines the court's reason-
ing in Johnston. This Comment demonstrates the weaknesses in
the court's analysis and argues that even under the narrower
test for determining essential similarity that the court imposed,
it should have found that Johnston's commission of involuntary
manslaughter in Texas constituted a felony in New York under
section 90(4). Finally, this Comment concludes that the court's
unduly narrow interpretation of section 90(4) and the strict
standard it appears to have created flout legislative intent and
are inconsistent with the important goals that underlie attorney
discipline.
ous crime" under § 90(4) are significantly different from the consequences of conviction
of a foreign felony that constitutes a felony under the statute. Conviction of a "serious
crime" does not result in automatic disbarment. Rather, the convicted attorney is enti-
tled to a hearing in which he or she can present evidence of mitigating circumstances
Moreover, the conviction may not result in disbarment; rather, the appellate division
may impose suspension, censure, or possibly no discipline at all.
In addition, the procedure for a hearing before the DDC, after which a recommenda-
tion to the appellate division of censure, suspension, or disbarment may or may not be
made, is not limited to attorneys who have been convicted of crimes. Rather, it is the
general procedure in any case where, after investigation, the DDC has determined that
an attorney may have violated a disciplinary rule of the code of professional responsibil-
ity, and the violation appears to be serious enough that it requires more than an admoni-
tion (discipline that the DDC can impose on its own). N.Y. CoUe. CODES R. & REGS. tit.
22, § 605.6 (1988). In many cases, therefore, an attorney convicted of a foreign felony
that is deemed to lack essential similarity to a New York felony is not treated much
differently, procedurally, than an attorney who has violated a disciplinary rule, but has
committed no crime at all.
1991]
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
Ann Johnston was admitted to the practice of law in New
York in 1984 by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in
the First Judicial Department.8 In 1986, she was involved in an
automobile accident in Texas." A woman in the car with which
Johnston's car collided was killed as a result of the accident. 10
Johnston was charged in Texas with one count of involuntary
manslaughter in the first degree-a felony under Texas law-for
driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated and, by reason of such
intoxication, causing the death of another.1 2 In 1988, a Texas
jury convicted Johnston of this crime. She was sentenced to a
term of imprisonment of ten years. 2
As a result of this conviction, the Departmental Disciplinary
Committee for the First Judicial Department in New York
(DDC) moved pursuant to section 90(4) for an order striking
Johnston's name from the roll of attorneys on the ground that
she was disbarred as a result of her Texas felony conviction.13 In
support of its motion, the DDC contended that the Texas felony
of involuntary manslaughter is essentially similar to the New
York felony of vehicular manslaughter. 4 In oppostion to the
I In re Johnston, 146 A.D.2d 222, 223, 539 N.Y.S.2d 903, 903-04 (lst Dep't 1989)
rev'd, 75 N.Y.2d 403, 553 N.E.2d 566, 554 N.Y.S. 2d 88 (1990).
Id. at 223, 539 N.Y.S.2d at 904.
10 Id.
Id.
12 Id.
13 Id. Section 90(4)(b) provides:
Whenever any attorney and counsellor-at-law shall be convicted of a fel-
ony as defined in paragraph e of this subdivision, there may be presented to
the appellate division of the supreme court a certified or exemplified copy of
the judgment of such conviction, and thereupon the name of the person so
convicted shall, by order of the court, be struck from the roll of attorneys.
N.Y. JuD. LAW § 90(4)(b) (McKinney 1983).
In New York, upon conviction of an offense that constitutes a felony under § 90(4),
an attorney is ipso facto disbarred. In re Barash, 20 N.Y.2d 154, 157, 228 N.E.2d 896,
898, 281 N.Y.S.2d 997, 1000 (1967). The disbarment is automatic, and the attorney is
prohibited from practicing law in New York as soon as the judgment of conviction is
rendered. N.Y. JuD. LAW § 90(4)(a); see note 1 and accompanying text supra. Strictly
speaking, therefore, the striking of the attorney's name from the roll of attorneys is
merely a formality. See Note, The New York Felony Disbarment Rule: A Proposal for
Reform, 47 FORDHAM L. REv. 606, 610 (1979).
"' In re Johnston, 146 A.D.2d 222, 223, 539 N.Y.S.2d 903, 904 (1st Dep't 1989).
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DDC's motion, Johnston contended that the offenses signifi-
cantly and lack essential similarity. She made two arguments.
First, Johnston argued that the Texas involuntary manslaughter
statute does not require proof of a culpable mental state,
whereas the New York vehicular manslaughter statute requires
proof of criminal negligence. 15 Second, Johnston argued that the
level of intoxication necessary to commit the crime of involun-
tary manslaughter in Texas is lower than the level required to
commit vehicular manslaughter in New York."0
B. The Appellate Division Decision
The appellate division held that the New York and Texas
offenses are essentially similar and ordered Johnston's name
stricken from the roll of attorneys.17 The court addressed and
dismissed Johnston's two arguments. First, the court considered
the issue of mental culpability, examining the relevant New
York and Texas statutes. It noted that in order to commit invol-
untary manslaughter in the first degree in Texas, a person must
either: (1) recklessly cause the death of another; or (2) acciden-
tally, in operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and because
of such intoxication, cause the death of another.18 The court
then examined New York's vehicular manslaughter statute."9 It
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 227, 539 N.Y.S.2d at 906.
1 The Texas statute provides in relevant part:
Involuntary Manslaughter
(a) A person commits an offense if he:
(1) recklessly causes the death of an individual; or
(2) by accident or mistake when operating a motor vehicle.., while in-
toxicated and, by reason of such intoxication, causes the death of an
individual.
(b) For purposes of this section, "intoxication" means that the actor doe not
have the normal use of his mental or physical faculties by reason of the volun-
tary introduction of any substance into his body.
(c) an offense under this section is a felony of the third degree.
Tax. PENAL CoDE ANN. § 19.05 (Vernon 1974) (amended 1987).
"The New York statute provides:
A person is guilty of vehicular manslaughter when he:
(1) commits the crime of criminally negligent homicide as defined in sec-
tion 125.10, and
(2) causes the death of such other person by operation of a vehicle in vio-
lation of subdivision two, three or four of section eleven hundred ninety-two of
the vehicle and traffic law ....
1991]
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noted that in order to commit vehicular manslaughter under
New York law, a person must commit criminally negligent homi-
cide20 by means of the operation of a motor vehicle while
intoxicated.21
The appellate division found that a violation of either sub-
section of the Texas involuntary manslaughter statute involves
an act of recklessness by the offender. At first glance it appears
as though one can commit involuntary manslaughter in Texas in
two different ways: either with the mens rea of "recklessness" or,
instead, without any mens rea, but rather by "accident or mis-
take" while operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated.22 How-
ever, the court found that Texas case law indicates otherwise.2 -3
For purposes of the statute, driving while intoxicated constitutes
recklessness per se under Texas law.24 Thus the court found, a
Vehicular manslaughter is a class D.felony.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.12 (McKinney 1987) (amended 1989).
For the text of New York's criminally negligent homicide statute, see note 20 infra.
For the text of § 1192 of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law, see note 21 infra.
20 New York Penal Law § 125.10 provides:
A person is guilty of criminally negligent homicide when, with criminal
negligence, he causes the death of another person.
Criminally negligent homicide is a class E felony.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.10 (McKinney 1987).
Criminal negligence is defined by New York Penal Law § 15.05(4) as follows:
A person acts with criminal negligence with respect to a result or to a
circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he fails to per-
ceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that
such circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that the
failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care
that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05 (4) (McKinney 1987).
21 Section 1192 of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law provides:
1. No person shall operate a motor vehicle while the person's ability to operate
such motor vehicle is impaired by the consumption of alcohol. A violation of
this subdivision shall be a traffic infraction ....
2. No person shall operate a motor vehicle while such person has .10 of one per
centum or more by weight of alcohol in the person's blood as shown by chemi-
cal analysis of such person's blood, breath, urine or saliva ....
3. No person shall operate a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition.
5. A violation of subdivision two [or] three. . . of this section shall be a mis-
demeanor ....
N.Y. V.H. & TRAu. LAW § 1192 (McKinney 1986) (amended 1988).
22 In re Johnston, 146 A.D.2d 222, 225, 539 N.Y.S.2d 903, 905 (1st Dep't 1989). See
note 18 supra for the text of the Texas involuntary manslaughter statute.
" Johnston, 146 A.D.2d at 225, 539 N.Y.S.2d at 905.
24 Id. at 225-26, 539 N.Y.S.2d at 905. See, e.g., Guerrero v. State, 605 S.W.2d 262,
[Vol. 57: 269
AUTOMATIC DISBARMENT
finding of guilt under the Texas statute for causing the death of
another by driving while intoxicated implicitly involves an act of
recklessness.
The court further reasoned that while the Texas involun-
tary manslaughter statute requires a showing of recklessness, the
New York vehicular manslaughter statute merely requires a
showing of criminal negligence. 25 Thus, the court concluded that
the Texas statute actually requires a higher degree of mental
culpability than does the New York statute.0 It therefore re-
jected Johnston's argument with respect to mental culpability.
The court then turned to the issue of intoxication. It found
Johnston's contention that the Texas statute required a lesser
showing of inebriation than the New York statute to be without
merit. Again, the court examined the language of the relevant
Texas and New York statutes and case law. Under the standard
provided by the Texas involuntary manslaughter statute, an ac-
tor is intoxicated when the actor "does not have the normal use
of his mental or physical faculties by reason of the voluntary
introduction of any substance into his body."27 New York case
264 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) ("a finding that the statutory elements of § 19.05(a)(2) have
been fulfilled constitutes, as a matter of law, a finding of reckless conduct. This is what is
meant by the term 'recklessness per se.' "); Ormsby v. State, 600 S.W.2d 782, 783 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1979) ("Subsection (a)(2) [of Section 19.05] defin[es] driving while intoxi-
cated as recklessness per se."); cf. Daniel v. State, 577 S.W.2d 231, 233 (Tex. Crim. App.
1979) (stating that the words "mistake" and "accident" as used in the statute only mean
"unintentional").
26 Johnston, 146 A.D.2d at 226, 539 N.Y.S.2d at 905. See note 20 supra for the text
of the New York statute.
26 In New York, culpable mental states are classified according to relative degrees.
From highest to lowest they are: intent, knowledge, recklessness, and criminal negli-
gence. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05 (McKinney 1987). Texas's scheme of classification of cul-
pable mental states is virtually identical to that of New York. Tim PENAL CODE: ANN. §
6.02 (Vernon 1974).
The appellate division's conclusion was in accord with Ormsby v. State, 600 S.W.2d
782, 783 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). The defendant in Ormsby was convicted of involuntary
manslaughter for killing another while driving under the influence of alcohol. On appeal,
the judgment of conviction was reversed because the trial court failed to instruct the jury
on criminal negligence, forcing the jury to choose between convicting Ormsby of involun-
tary manslaughter or acquitting him of any criminal wrongdoing. Id. at 785. The appel-
late court held that criminally negligent homicide is a lesser included offense of involun-
tary manslaughter because criminal negligence is a lower degree of mental culpability
than recklessness. Id. The court explicitly rejected the state's contention that the culpa-
ble mental of criminal negligence is higher than that required for a conviction under the
involuntary manslaughter statute. Id.
'1 Johnston, 146 A.D.2d at 226, 539 N.Y.S.2d at 906. See note 18 supra for the text
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law provides that intoxication occurs "when the driver has vol-
untarily consumed alcohol to the extent that he is incapable of
.employing the physical and mental abilities which he is expected
to possess in order to operate a vehicle as a reasonable and pru-
dent driver."2 8 The court concluded that based on a comparison
of the foregoing language, it was evident that the definitions of
intoxication under the New York and Texas statutes are essen-
tially similar.2
C. The Court of Appeals Decision
The court of appeals reversed the order of the appellate di-
vision, finding that the Texas and New York felonies are not es-
sentially similar. In so concluding, the court of appeals, as had
the appellate division, examined the relevant Texas and New
York statutes and case law.
First, the court considered Johnston's argument with re-
spect to the necessary level of intoxication. Under New York
law, a driver violates different offenses depending upon her de-
gree of inebriation. A driver may be convicted of driving while
"impaired" or, instead, driving while "intoxicated," a greater of-
fense requiring a higher level of inebriation." By contrast, no
distinction with respect to levels of inebriation is made under
Texas law; the Texas involuntary manslaughter statute merely
has as an element that a person drive while "intoxicated."3 1 The
court reasoned that the distinction in New York between im-
pairment and intoxication is important because in order to com-
mit the offense of vehicular manslaughter under New York law,
one must drive while intoxicated; driving while impaired is
insufficient.32
The Texas involuntary manslaughter statute defines the
term intoxication. In New York, on the other hand, the terms
of the Texas involuntary manslaughter statute.
28 Id. at 227, 539 N.Y.S.2d at 906. The definition is derived from the court of ap-
peals's decision in People v. Cruz, 48 N.Y.2d 419, 339 N.E.2d 513, 423 N.Y.S.2d 625
(1979), appeal dismissed, 446 U.S. 901 (1980). See text accompanying note 70-77 infra.
Johnston, 146 A.D.2d at 227, 539 N.Y.S.2d at 906.
" In re Johnston, 75 N.Y.2d 403, 408, 553 N.E.2d 566, 568-69, 554 N.Y.S.2d 88, 90-
91 (1990). See note 21 supra for the text of New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192.
l See note 18 supra.
32 Johnston, 75 N.Y.2d at 409, 553 N.E.2d at 569, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 91.
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impairment and intoxication have been defined by case law.33
Relying on its previous interpretation of these terms, the court
found that impairment means that a person "has actually im-
paired, to any extent, the physical and mental abilities which he
is expected to possess in order to operate a vehicle as a reasona-
ble and prudent driver."'3 ' It further found that intoxication is a
greater degree of impairment which is reached "when the driver
has voluntarily consumed alcohol to the extent that he is incapa-
ble of employing the physical and mental abilities which he is
expected to possess in order to operate a motor vehicle as a rea-
sonable and prudent driver.' 35
After examining Texas case law, the court found that a
showing of intoxication under the Texas involuntary manslaugh-
ter statute merely requires proof of impairment of physical and
mental abilities "to any degree." 6 It reasoned that the showing
of inebriation necessary for one to be considered intoxicated3 7 in
Texas closely approximates the showing of inebriation necessary
for one to be considered impaired in New York, which the court
had defined as the impairment of physical and mental abilities
"to any extent."3 8 It therefore found that the standard for intox-
ication in New York is significantly higher than the standard for
intoxication in Texas." Thus, the court concluded, the New
York and Texas statutes lack essential similarity with respect to
the level of inebriation needed for conviction.
Second, the court of appeals considered Johnston's argu-
ment regarding mental culpability. The court held that the
-" In defining the terms impairment and intoxication under § 1192, the court relied
on its decision in People v. Cruz, 48 N.Y.2d 419, 399 N.E.2d 513, 423 N.Y.S.2d 625
(1979), appeal dismissed, 446 U.S. 901 (1980). See text accompanying notes 70-77 infra.
3, Johnston, 75 N.Y.2d at 408-09, 553 N.E.2d at 568-69, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 90-91
(quoting People v. Cruz, 48 N.Y.2d 419, 427, 399 N.E.2d 513, 516, 423 N.Y.S.2d 625, 628,
appeal dismissed 446 U.S. 901 (1980)) (emphasis added by Johnston court).
- Id. at 409, 553 N.E.2d at 569, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 91.
36 Id. For a discussion of why the court's finding is probably erroneous, see note 69
infra.
37 See TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.05(b) (Vernon 1974) (amended 1987); see note
18 supra for the text of § 19.05(b).
See text accompanying note 34 supra.
Johnston, 75 N.Y.2d at 409, 553 N.E.2d at 569, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 91. In addition,
the court found that the Texas statute focuses upon the subjective tolerance of the indi-
vidual in determining intoxication, while the New York test employs an objective test
that measures the actor's control of his physical and mental abilities against that of the
reasonable prudent driver. Id.
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Texas and New York felonies differ significantly with respect to
the culpable mental state required.40 Essentially, the court
found, as had the appellate division, that the presence of a cul-
pable mental state need not be independently proved to estab-
lish the Texas felony; rather, proof of driving while intoxicated
constitutes recklessness per se under Texas law.41 By contrast,
the New York felony of vehicular manslaughter requires proof
that the actor drove while intoxicated and that the actor acted
with criminal negligence.42 The court simply did not accept the
implicit presence of recklessness inherent in a violation of the
statute under Texas law as sufficient to find essential similarity.
Instead, the court held that the elements of the statutes and the
proof of mental culpability required thereunder differ so that
the statutes lack essential similarity.
II. ANALYSIS
A. The Court of Appeals Narrows the Test of "Essential
Similarity"
In Johnston, the court of appeals significantly narrowed its
essential similarity test for determining whether conviction of a
foreign felony will constitute conviction of a felony under section
90(4). Previously, it was not required that every element of a
New York felony be present in the foreign felony, as long as the
core of the offense proscribed by the statutes was the same.
Moreover, it was formerly irrelevant that the foreign statute in-
cluded a legislative presumption, rather than required direct
proof, of an element present in a New York statute. Application
of the court's new, narrower standard will inevitably reduce the
class of cases in which a foreign felony will constitute a felony
under section 90(4). Under this narrower standard, therefore, it
is significantly less likely that an attorney convicted of a foreign
felony will be subject to automatic disbarment in New York.
1. The Development of the Essential Similarity Test
The essential similarity test was primarily developed in two
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
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opinions of the court of appeals: In re Chu 3 and In re Margi-
otta." These decisions hold that in order for a foreign felony
conviction to require automatic disbarment in New York, the
foreign felony need not be a mirror image of an analogous New
York felony. Rather, the two felonies need only have essential
similarity.45
The essential similarity test originated in the court of ap-
peals's decision in In re Chu.'8 Chu, an attorney, was convicted
of four counts of a federal felony offense of making and submit-
ting false documents to the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice in connection with the fraudulent procurement of perma-
nent residence in the United States for aliens.4'7 The appellate
division rejected the bar association's contention that, owing to
its similarity to the New York felony of offering a false instru-
ment for filing in the first degree,48 Chu was automatically dis-
barred as a result of his federal felony conviction.'9
4- 42 N.Y.2d 490, 369 N.E.2d 1, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (1977).
" 60 N.Y.2d 147, 456 N.E.2d 798, 468 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1983).
45 In re Margiotta, 60 N.Y.2d 147, 150, 456 N.E.2d 798, 799, 468 N.Y.S.2d 857, 858
(1983); In re Calm, 52 N.Y.2d 479, 482, 420 N.E.2d 945, 946, 438 N.Y.S.2d 753, 754
(1981) (citing In re Chu, 42 N.Y.2d 490, 369 N.E.2d 1, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (1977)).
46 42 N.Y.2d 490, 369 N.E.2d 1, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (1977). For a general discussion
of the Chu decision, see Comment, Attorney Discipline: Disbarment: The Mandatory
Result of a Federal Felony Conviction, 44 BRooKLYN L. REy. 646 (1978).
4" Chu, 42 N.Y.2d at 491, 369 N.E.2d at 1, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 1001.
48 The statute provides:
A person is guilty of offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree
when, knowing that a written instrument contains a false statement or false
information, and with intent to defraud the state or any political subdivision
thereof, he offers or presents it to a public office or public servant with the
knowledge or belief that it will be filed with, registered or recorded in or other-
wise become a part of the records of such public office or public servant.
Offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree is a class E felony.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 175.35 (McKinney 1988).
49 The federal statute under which Chu was convicted, 18 U.S.C. § 1001, provides:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or
agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers
up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious
or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing
or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent
statement or entry, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988).
The decision in Chu was rendered before the 1979 amendment to New York's Judi-
ciary Law adding § 90(4)(e). See note 2 supra and notes 88-94 and accompanying text
infra. Thus, the bar association's contention that Chu's federal felony conviction war-
1991]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
The court of appeals reversed the decision of the appellate
division, holding that an attorney's conviction of any federal fel-
ony is sufficient to invoke automatic disbarment.50 However, in
dicta,51 the court also rejected Chu's argument that the federal
and state offenses at issue in the case differed significantly.2
ranted automatic disbarment under § 90(4) as it then existed, see note 89 infra, was
based on the rule established in In re Donegan, 282 N.Y. 285, 26 N.E.2d 260 (1940), that
conviction of a foreign felony warranted automatic disbarment in New York if the for-
eign felony was "cognizable" as a felony under New York law. See notes 93-94 infra.
00 Chu, 42 N.Y.2d at 493, 369 N.E.2d at 3, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 1003. See also text ac-
companying notes 90-93 infra.
" Although the Chu court's analysis that the federal and state statutes at issue suf-
ficiently matched to require automatic disbarment was, strictly speaking, dicta, the court
of appeals has relied on and explicitly approved of this analysis in its decisions constru-
ing § 90(4)(e) rendered since 1979. See In re Margiotta, 60 N.Y.2d 147, 150, 456 N.E.2d
798, 799, 468 N.Y.S.2d 857, 858 (1983) ("In Matter of Chu, by way of example, essential
similarity was found in the core of the offense under State and Federal statutes, al-
though only the New York felony required specific intent to defraud.") (citation omit-
ted); In re Cahn, 52 N.Y.2d 479, 482, 420 N.E.2d 945, 946, 438 N.Y.S.2d 753, 754 (1981)
("[T]he felony in the other jurisdiction need not be a mirror image of the New York
felony, precisely corresponding in every detail (see Matter of Chu), though it must have
essential similarity.") (citation omitted).
There have also been numerous appellate division decisions since 1979 that, in reli-
ance on Chu, specifically hold that 18 U.S.C. § 1001 is essentially similar to N.Y. PENAL
LAw § 175.35. See, e.g., In re Sparrow, 161 A.D.2d 829, 556 N.Y.S.2d 176 (3d Dep't
1990); In re Darlington, 136 A.D.2d 339, 527 N.Y.S.2d 441 (2d Dep't 1988); In re Galang,
94 A.D.2d 280, 464 N.Y.S.2d 163 (1st Dep't 1983).
Finally, it is notable that three judges concurred in the Chu decision in a separate
opinion. Although they believed that an extension of the scope of § 90(4) to cover any
federal felony was unwarranted, they concluded that "the parallels between the elements
of the Federal felonies at issue in this case are so similar to their New York State ana-
logues that automatic disbarment is an appropriate result." Chu, 42 N.Y.2d at 495, 369
N.E.2d at 4, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 1004 (Wachtler, J., conc' rring).
52 Chu had pointed out that in order to be convicted under § 175.35, the state must
prove that the defendant acted "with intent to defraud the state or any political subdivi-
sion thereof." Chu, 42 N.Y.2d at 494, 369 N.E.2d at 3, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 1003. See note 48
supra for the full text of § 175.35. Such specific intent is not an element of and need not
be proved under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. See note 49 supra. Unpersuaded, the court stated that
"there is a very close, if not a precise, parallelism between the conduct proscribed by
section 1001 and that proscribed by section 175.35." Chu, 42 N.Y.2d at 494, 369 N.E.2d
at 3, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 1003. The court reasoned that "[t]he core of the offense under both
statutes is the willful filing in a governmental office of a false statement knowing it to be
false" and that in the case before it "such matching suffices." Id. Indeed, the court as-
serted that "[t]o accord determinative significance to such statutory discrepancy would
be to elevate insignificance." Id.
The breadth of the essential similarity test established in Chu is more clearly illus-
trated by observing that there exists under New York law a misdemeanor denominated
offering a false instrument for filing in the second degree. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 175.30 (Mc-
Kinney 1988). This misdemeanor is a lesser included offense of offering a false instru-
ment for filing in the first degree, § 175.35, the New York felony found to be essentially
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Under the test for essential similarity established in Chu,
conduct that constitutes a felony in a foreign jurisdiction also
constitutes a felony for the purposes of section 90(4), as long as
the core of the offense is the same as that under an existing New
York statute.3 The statutes may have essential similarity, even
though the New York felony requires proof of an element absent
from the federal offense, and despite the fact that there exists a
more closely analogous New York statute whose violation does
not constitute a felony."
The second decision in which the court developed the scope
of the essential similarity test is In re Margiotta.5 In Mlargiotta,
an attorney was convicted under federal law of extortion in vio-
lation of the Hobbs Act." The appellate division found that
similar to the federal felony of which Chu was convicted. Section 175.30 consists of the
same elements as § 175.35, except that § 175.30 does not require a showing of a specific
intent to defraud. It is, therefore, clearly more closely analogous to 18 U.S.C. § 1001 than
is § 175.35. Indeed, it seems apparent that by creating separable offenses, the New York
legislature specifically intended that when an actor files a false statement, but lacks a
specific intent to defraud, the actor's conduct does not rise to the level of a felony. Nev-
ertheless, the Chu court found the federal and New York felonies at issue to be essen-
tially similar.
53 It is notable that in its decisions rendered prior to Johnston, the court of appeals
made clear that the determination of whether two criminal offenses are esentially simi-
lar should be made with an awareness that the court is reasoning within the broader
framework of attorney discipline, as opposed to the narrower framework of criminal pun-
ishment. See Chu, 42 N.Y.2d at 493, 369 N.E.2d at 2, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 1002 ('IThe
perspective with which the sentencing of convicted criminals is approached-the impo3i-
tion of individual punishment-is quite different from that involved in profe-sional dis-
ciplinary proceedings ... ."); In re Mlargiotta, 60 N.Y.2d 147, 151, 456 N.E2d 798, 800,
468 N.Y.S.2d 857, 859 (1983) (emphasizing that in attorney disciplinary proceedings,
"our focus is different," and finding that, "[flor purposes of determining only 'essential
similarity,"' a violation of the Hobbs Act is essentially similar to a commission of lar-
ceny by extortion under New York law); see notes 57-61 and accompanying text infra.
" See note 52 supra.
55 60 N.Y.2d 147, 456 N.E.2d 798, 468 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1983).
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), (b) (1988). The statute provides in relevant part,
The term "extortion" means the obtaining of property from another, with
his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or
fear, or under color of official right.
18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1988).
Margiotta was chairman of the Republican Committee of both Nas"u County and
the Town of Hempstead, New York. United States v. Margiotta, 662 F.2d 131, 134 (2d
Cir. 1981). Although he held no elective office, his position as chairman gave him sub-
stantial control over republican public officials in Hempstead and Nassau County. Id. at
134-35. Margiotta played a dominant role in hiring and promotion decisions. United
States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 117 (2d Cir. 1982).
Margiotta had the Presiding Supervisor of Hempstead appoint a long-time political
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Margiotta's federal felony conviction was essentially similar to
the New York felony of larceny by extortion, 7 and, therefore,
that he was automatically disbarred."
The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the appellate
division, rejecting Margiotta's arguments on appeal. 9 Under the
associate of Margiotta as the Broker of Record for the Town of Hempstead. United
States v. Margiotta, 662 F.2d 131, 135 (2d Cir. 1981). It was the Broker's responsibility to
obtain insurance on properties owned by the Town. Id. Upon placing a policy on munici-
pal property, the Broker received, as a commission, a portion of the insurance premiums
paid by the municipality. Id. As a result of a deal between Margiotta and the Broker,
50% of the commissions earned by the broker were paid as "kickbacks" to political allies
of Margiotta. Id. at 136.
At trial, the Government contended that Margiotta was guilty of extortion in viola-
tion of the Hobbs Act. The government claimed that Margiotta, through his control of
the Presiding Supervisor (the public official responsible for appointing the Broker of
Record), induced the Broker to pay the "kickbacks," and that Margiotta did so by acting
under color of official right and by means of the wrongful use of fear. Margiotta, 688
F.2d at 114.
57 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.05. The statute provides in relevant part:
2. Larceny includes a wrongful taking... of another's property... commit-
ted in any of the following ways:
(e) By extortion.
A person obtains property by extortion when he compels or induces another
person to deliver such property to himself or to a third person by means of
instilling in him a fear that, if the property is not so delivered, the actor or
another will
(viii) Use or abuse his position as a public servant by performing some act
within or related to his official duties, or by failing or refusing to perform an
official duty, in such manner as affect some person adversely ....
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.05 (McKinney 1988).
8 In re Margiotta, 87 A.D.2d 336, 451 N.Y.S.2d 454 (2d Dep't 1982).
59 On appeal, Margiotta argued that under the Hobbs Act, an actor can be convicted
of extortion for obtaining the property of another, with his consent, either by instilling
fear in the victim or by acting under color of official right. See note 56 supra. Therefore,
there is no requirement of instilling fear in order to establish the federal crime. By con-
trast, the New York felony of larceny by extortion requires a showing that an actor com-
pelled his victim to deliver property by means of instilling fear in his victim. See note 57
supra. Thus, in order to be convicted under the New York statute, it must be shown that
by "acting under color of official right," an actor in fact instilled fear in his victim. Mar-
giotta contended that because the jury at his trial rendered a general verdict, it was
impossible to determine if it even considered whether he had instilled fear in his victim.
In re Margiotta, 60 N.Y.2d 147, 151, 456 N.E.2d 798, 800, 468 N.Y.S.2d 857, 859 (1983).
In rejecting Margiotta's argument, the court reasoned that while there may be no
requirement of instilling fear under the Hobbs Act, the federal statute reflected the
"common law belief" that the element of fear is implicit when one extorts money by
acting under color of public office. Id. Accordingly, the court stated that even though
Margiotta may have been convicted solely for obtaining property under color of official
right, the federal and New York felonies are essentially similar. Id. at 153, 456 N.E.2d at
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essential similarity test as applied in Margiotta, the court of ap-
peals found that a foreign felony may be essentially similar to a
New York felony even though the foreign felony implicitly in-
volves the presence of conduct that must be expressly proved
under the New York statute.
2. The Narrowing of the Essential Similarity Test in
Johnston
An examination of the court of appeals's reasoning in John-
ston reveals that it has substantially narrowed the essential sim-
ilarity test developed in Chu and Margiotta. The court now
seems to require that a foreign offense and a New York offense
have a considerably stricter identity of elements than was previ-
ously necessary.
A comparison of the Johnston court's analysis of the issue
of intoxication with the application of the essential similarity
test in Chu is illustrative. In Johnston, the court held that the
differences it perceived between the standards for determining
intoxication under Texas and New York law deprived the two
felonies at issue of essential similarity.00 Specifically, the court
found that the standard of intoxication under Texas law more
nearly approximates the standard of impairment under New
York law, a level of inebriation insufficient to support a convic-
tion under New York's vehicular manslaughter statute.
Because section 90(4) focuses on an attorney's conduct,01
the court's reasoning presumably was as follows: Although it is
possible that the Texas jury that convicted Johnston believed
her to be so inebriated that she was intoxicated under New
York's definition of that term, the jury was only required to find
that she was intoxicated under Texas's supposedly lower stan-
801, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 859.
Interestingly, Margiotta was recently reinstated by the appellate division pursuant
to N.Y. Judiciary Law § 90(5). N.Y.L.J., Mar. 22, 1991, at 1, col 1. Section 90(5) pro-
vides: "If... removal or debarment was based upon conviction for a felony... the
appellate division shall have power to vacate or modify such order or debarment after a
period of seven years provided that such person has not been convicted of a crime during
such seven-year period." N.Y. JuD. LAw § 90(5)(b) (McKinney 1933).
See notes 30-39 and accompanying text supra.
"l The statute provides for automatic disbarment when the foreign offense of which
the attorney is convicted, "if committed within this state, would constitute a felony in
this state." N.Y. JuD. LAw § 90(4)(e). See note 2 supra for the text of the statute.
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dard. Because it is impossible to know exactly how inebriated
the jury found Johnston to be, it is impossible to know whether
her level of inebriation was sufficiently high to constitute intoxi-
cation under New York law. Since it is impossible to know
whether Johnston's level of inebriation satisfies the element of
intoxication under New York's vehicular manslaughter statute,
it is impossible to know if her conduct was such that she could
be guilty of that crime. It is therefore impossible to know
whether her conduct constitutes a felony under New York law.
Hence, she could not be subject to automatic disbarment under
section 90(4).
In Chu, on the other hand, the court found that the foreign
and New York felonies at issue are essentially similar, even
though conviction under the New York statute requires a show-
ing of a specific intent to defraud, an element that does not have
to be proved under the federal statute.2 The Chu court found it
irrelevant that it was impossible to know whether the jury that
convicted Chu believed or even considered whether he possessed
a specific intent to defraud. The court in Chu reasoned that the
felonies match sufficiently because the core of the offense under
both statutes is the same.
The Johnston court offered no explanation why knowing for
certain whether the jury that convicted Johnston believed that.
her inebriation reached the level of intoxication, rather than im-
pairment, under New York law, is any more important than
knowing whether the.jury that convicted Chu believed that he
had, rather than lacked, the specific intent to defraud required
for conviction under the New York statute at issue in his case.
In addition, it is equally difficult to understand why the court of
appeals would fail to find that the "core of the offense" pro-
scribed by the Texas and New York statutes in Johnston is the
same, when the court had found essential similarity between the
New York and foreign felonies in Chu on that basis. It seems
patently clear that the core of the offense under both the Texas
and New York statutes at issue in Johnston is killing another
while driving under the influence of alcohol. Indeed, both stat-
utes were unquestionably enacted to deter precisely the same
conduct, drunken driving, in almost precisely the same way: by
" See notes 46-54 and accompanying text supra.
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subjecting to enhanced penalties6 3 those who kill others because
they drive while under the influence.6 Because the court in
Johnston offered no explanation for the inconsistencies in rea-
soning evident upon a comparison of the decisions in the two
cases, the logical conclusion is that it simply narrowed the stan-
dard for determining essential similarity.
The court's analysis of the issue of mental culpability in
Johnston also demonstrated a substantially narrower applica-
tion of the essential similarity test than that used in Margiotta.
The Johnston court held that the New York and Texas statutes
lack essential similarity because no mental culpability need be
proved in order to establish the Texas felony.3 It refused to
adopt the determination of the Texas courts that the legislature
considered any violation of the involuntary manslaughter statute
to involve an act of recklessness.
In Margiotta, however, the court found essential similarity
between the New York and foreign felonies at issue. 0 The New
York extortion statute requires the defendant to have instilled
fear in his victim by acting under color of official right, while the
federal statute under which Margiotta was convicted requires
only that the defendant instilled fear or that he acted under offi-
cial right. The Margiotta court found it irrelevant that the jury
that convicted Margiotta rendered a general verdict, making it
impossible to determine whether or not he instilled fear in his
victim. It held that the federal statute reflects the common law
belief that the element of fear is implicit when one extorts
money by acting under color of official right. Thus, the court ac-
cepted that Congress promulgated the Hobbs Act against the
background of this common law belief and determined that any
63 Under New York law, criminally negligent homicide is a class E felony, N.Y. PE-
NAT. LAW § 125.10 (McKinney 1987), and carries a sentence of up to four years. Vehicular
manslaughter (ie., the commission of criminally negligent homicide by operation of a
vehicle while intoxicated) is a class D felony, id. § 125.10, and carries a sentence of up to
seven years. Similarly, under Texas law criminally negligent homicide is a class A misde-
meanor, TEx. PENAL Cons ANN. § 19.07 (Vernon 1974), and carries a sentence of up to
two years in jail, while involuntary manslaughter is a felony of the third degree, id. §
19.05, and carries a sentence of up to ten years in prison.
, Indeed, the court conceded that "both the Texas and the New York statutes are
directed at the evil of drunken driving." In re Johnston, 75 N.Y.2d 403, 410, 553 N.E.2d
566, 569, 554 N.Y.S.2d 88, 91 (1990).
85 See notes 40-42 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 55-59 and accompanying text supra.
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violation of the statute implicitly involves the act of instilling
fear in the victim.
The court's application of its essential similarity test in
Johnston is inconsistent with, and narrower than, its application
in Margiotta. In Margiotta, the court was willing to accept the
determination of Congress that, under federal law, the conduct
of extorting money by acting under color of official right implic-
itly involves instilling fear in the victim. In Johnston, however,
the court was unwilling to accept the determination of the Texas
legislature that, under Texas law, the conduct of killing someone
by driving drunk implicitly involves an act of recklessness.
There does not appear to be any logical reason, and the court
offered no explanation, for this inconsistency. The only logical
conclusion is that the court narrowed its test for determining
essential similarity.0
67 There are, of course, obvious distinctions between the felonies of which Chu and
Margiotta were convicted, on the one hand, and the felony of which Johnston was con-
victed, on the other. Chu engaged in the criminal conduct for which he was convicted,
submitting false documents, in the course of his law practice. Although the conduct for
which Margiotta was convicted, abusing his public office to extort money, did not occur
as a part of the practice of law, it clearly evinced seriously deficient qualities relevant to
the practice of law. By contrast, the relevance of Johnston's commission of involuntary
manslaughter to her ability to practice law is arguably more remote.
It must be assumed that the court of appeals was aware of these distinctions. In-
deed, it seems plausible that these distinctions may have motivated the court's decision.
In its analysis, however, the court quite properly did not address this issue.
The fact that there is a closer nexus between the ability to practice law and the
felonies committed by Chu and Margiotta than between the ability to practice law and
involuntary manslaughter would be inappropriate as a basis for the court's decision. Sec-
tion 90(4) explicitly provides for automatic disbarment upon conviction of any criminal
offense that constitutes a felony in New York. N.Y. JUD. LAw § 90(4)(a). Moreover, the
structure of the statute evinces the legislature's intent to provide for automatic disbar-
ment without regard to the type of felony committed. Section 90(4)(d) defines the term
,$serious crime." It provides in relevant part:
[T]he term serious crime shall mean any criminal offense denominated a felony
under the laws of any state, district or territory or of the United States which
does not constitute a felony under the laws of this state, and any other crime a
necessary element of which, as determined by statutory or common law defini-
tion of such crime, includes interference with the administration of justice,
false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, willful failure to file income tax re-
turns, deceit, bribery, extortion, misappropriation, theft, or an attempt or con-
spiracy or solicitation of another to commit a serious crime.
N.Y. JuD. LAW § 90(4)(d) (McKinney 1983).
Section 90(4)(e) goes on to provide that the term felony means any New York felony or
any foreign felony that, if committed in New York, would constitute a felony in New
York. N.Y. JuD. LAw § 90(4)(e). See note 2 supra.
In subdivision d, the legislature makes clear that only certain types of misdemean-
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B. The Weaknesses in the Johnston Court's Analysis
In some ways, it is strange that the court of appeals should
choose the Johnston case as a vehicle for narrowing its essential
similarity test. In order to find that Johnston was not automati-
cally disbarred as a result of her Texas felony conviction, the
court engaged in a rather weak, result-oriented analysis. This is
readily apparent because even under the narrower test for essen-
tial similarity that the court applied, it should have found that
the felonies at issue are essentially similar. First, the court
should have concluded that the standard for determining intoxi-
cation in Texas is the same as the standard in New York. Sec-
ond, the court should have found that the mens rea requirement
of New York's vehicular manslaughter statute was satisfied be-
cause Johnston acted with criminal negligence.
1. The Standard of Intoxication in Texas is the Same as
the Standard in New York
The court in Johnston held that the Texas and New York
statutes at issue lack essential similarity with respect to the ele-
ment of intoxication." In so finding, the court noted that under
Texas law, unlike under New York law, the act of driving under
the influence of alcohol is not separated into the greater and
lesser offenses of driving while intoxicated and driving while im-
paired. Rather, under Texas law only the term intoxicated is
ors, those which clearly evidence deficient qualities relevant to the practice of law, are to
be considered serious crimes that subject an attorney to discipline under the statute.
However, no such limitation is made with respect to the type of crime committed when
the offense of which an attorney is convicted is a felony. The legislature thus clearly
expressed its belief that when an attorney commits any offense that constitutes a felony
under New York law, it is sufficiently serious to require automatic disbarment. There-
fore, a decision that held that the commission of involuntary manslaughter in Texas does
not require automatic disbarment under § 90(4), because the nexus between the commis-
sion of involuntary manslaughter and the practice of law is insufficiently close, would be
flatly inconsistent with legislative intent and would entail an inappropriate analysis.
Moreover, it is superficial simply to state that the commission of involuntary man-
slaughter does not directly reflect on an attorney's ability to practice law. Killing another
because one chose to drive while intoxicated demonstrates an irresponsibility and lack of
concern for others that could well be dangerous in law practice.
Furthermore, the protection of the public from incompetent attorneys is not the
only rationale behind the imposition of attorney discipline. The protection of the public
image of the bar, for the benefit of both the public and the profession, is another impor-
tant goal. See notes 99-103 and accompanying text infra.
11 See notes 30-39 and accompanying text supra.
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used. Because the court believed that the measure of intoxica-
tion under Texas law more closely approximates the measure of
impairment under New York law, 9 it concluded that the jury
that convicted Johnston was not required to find that her level
of inebriation was sufficient to constitute intoxication under the
New York standard. Thus, the court held that the statutes lack
essential similarity.
Under New York law, a driver is considered intoxicated
when he "has voluntarily consumed alcohol to the extent that he
is incapable of employing the physical and mental abilities
which he is expected to possess in order to operate a vehicle as a
reasonable and prudent driver. 1 70 The court of appeals could
properly have found that Johnston was intoxicated under the
New York standard based on her Texas conviction. This is so
69 See notes 36-39 and accompanying text supra.
After quoting the language of Texas's statutory definition of intoxication, see note
18 supra, and of the definition of intoxication provided in Cruz, see text accompanying
note 35 supra, the court merely stated, without further analysis, that "It]he Now York
standard for determining 'intoxication' is significantly higher than the standard in
Texas." In re Johnston, 75 N.Y.2d 403, 409, 553 N.E.2d 566, 569, 554 N.Y.S.2d 88, 91
(1990). Primarily, the court relied on its finding that the Texas standard merely requires
proof of intoxication "to any degree," id., and compared this with the New York stan-
dard of "impairment," which merely requires the impairment of physical and mental
abilities "to any extent." See text accompanying notes 34-39 supra. The court then con-
cluded that the Texas standard of intoxication more nearly approximates the New York
standard of "impairment" than the New York standard of "intoxication."
The phrase "to any degree" comes from Lockhart v. State, 108 Tex. Crim. 597, 1
S.W.2d 894, 895 (1927), the case from which the definition of intoxication under the
Texas involuntary manslaughter statute is derived. Searcy & Patterson, 1973 Practice
Commentary, TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. at 110 (Vernon 1989). However, the phrase so ex-
tracted is misleading. Quoted more completely, the Lockhart court held: "the term, 'in-
toxicated . . . to any degree' . . . [means] that a person has taken into his stomach a
sufficient quantity of intoxicating liquor so as to deprive him of the normal control of his
bodily or mental faculties." Lockhart, 108 Tex. Crim. at 599, 1 S.W.2d at 895. Indeed,
Lockhart was not a case that interpreted the definition of intoxication in the Texas
involuntary manslaughter statute; quite the opposite, the definition of intoxication in
Texas instead derives from Lockhart, a case decided long before Texas' involuntary
manslaughter statute was enacted. It is therefore significant that neither the "to any
degree" language, nor anything like it, was imported into the statute's definition of in-
toxication, which instead merely provides that "'intoxication' means that the actor does
not have the normal use of his mental or physical faculties by reason of the voluntary
introduction of any substance into his body." TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.05 (Vernon
1974) (amended 1987).
70 In re Johnston, 75 N.Y.2d 403, 409, 553 N.E.2d 566, 569, 554 N.Y.S.2d 88, 91
(1990) (quoting People v. Cruz, 48 N.Y.2d, 419, 428, 399 N.E.2d 513, 517, 423 N.Y.S.2d
625, 629 (1979), appeal dismissed, 446 U.S. 901 (1980)). See notes 33-35 and accompany-
ing text supra.
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because the Texas involuntary manslaughter statute explicitly
requires the jury to find that the defendant's intoxication
caused the death of another.7 1 Therefore, when a defendant is
convicted under the Texas statute, the jury cannot find that the
defendant drove as a reasonable and prudent driver, but simply
got into an accident purely by mistake and happened to be
under the influence at the time. Rather, a jury necessarily must
find that the defendant's inebriation caused her to drive in a
substandard manner. After all, if they do not so find, it is un-
clear how they could possibly find that the accident was caused
by the defendant's intoxication.
Thus, in order to convict under the Texas statute, a jury
must find present exactly those elements that constitute intoxi-
cation under New York law. The jury must find that the defend-
ant voluntarily consumed alcohol, and that, as a result, the de-
fendant was unable to employ "the physical and mental abilities
which he is expected to possess in order to operate a vehicle as a
reasonable and prudent driver." The court of appeals could
therefore have properly concluded that, based on her Texas con-
viction, Johnston was intoxicated under New York law.
In addition, because the terms intoxicated and impaired are
not defined by statute in New York, in its analysis the court re-
lied on the definitions of those terms provided by New York case
law. Specifically, the court relied on its decision in People v.
Cruz.
7 2
The defendant in Cruz had challenged the constitutionality
of section 1192 of the New York Vehicle and Traffic law by as-
serting that its use of the terms impairment and intoxication,
without further clarification of their meaning, rendered the stat-
ute unconstitutionally vague. 3 The court of appeals upheld the
" See note 18 supra and notes 80 & 86 infra.
- 48 N.Y.2d 419, 399 N.E.2d 513, 423 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1979), appeal dismissed, 446
U.S. 901 (1980).
7 Cruz argued that because the legislature had omitted any definition or standard
of comparison for the terms "impairment" and "intoxication" under the statute, it failed
to satisfy due process requirements. Cruz, 48 N.Y.2d at 423, 399 N.E.2d at 514, 423
N.Y.S.2d at 626. He contended that with respect to the term impairment, it was unclear
whether a driver is prohibited from driving when he is extremely impaired, moderately
impaired, or only slightly impaired. Id. at 426, 399 N.E.2d at 516, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 628.
Moreover, he argued that the line between impairment and intoxication under the stat-
ute was vague because a driver has no warning as to when he might cross the line from
impairment to intoxication and thereby be guilty of the more serious offense. Id. at 427,
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statute. It reasoned that the failure of the legislature to provide
a definition of intoxication did not render that term without a
definite or ascertainable meaning. 4 The court stated: "Intoxica-
tion is not an unfamiliar concept. It is intelligible to the, average
person. It is familiar to the law. . .. A statute which employs
terms having an accepted meaning 'long recognized in law and
life' cannot be said to be so vague and indefinite as to afford...
inadequate guidelines for adjudication."5 The statute was ade-
quate because "the concept of intoxication does not require ex-
pert opinion. A layman. . . should be able to determine whether
the defendant's consumption of alcohol has rendered him inca-
pable of operating a motor vehicle as he should.
7 6
The court's reasoning in Johnston is logically inconsistent
with its reasoning in Cruz. Under the court's analysis, the con-
cept of intoxication is familiar and intelligible to the average
person. Presumably, the average Texan shares the same concep-
tion of intoxication as the average New Yorker. Therefore, when,
pursuant to the Texas statute, the average Texans who com-
posed the jury that convicted Johnston were asked to determine
whether she was "intoxicated," they ought to have applied the
same understanding of intoxication that a New York jury would
have applied.77 Under the reasoning in Cruz, therefore, the stan-
dard applied in determining intoxication under New York law
ought to be the same as the standard applied in determining in-
toxication under Texas law. Thus, the court of appeals could
logically and properly have found that, based on her conviction
in Texas, Johnston was intoxicated within the meaning of sec-
tion 1192.
399 N.E.2d at 516, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 628-29..
" Id. at 427, 399 N.E.2d at 517, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 629.
75 Id. at 427-28, 399 N.E.2d at 517, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 629 (citation omitted).
78 Id.
77 Notably, in 1987, after the commission of the offense for which Johnston was con-
victed, Texas amended its involuntary manslaughter statute. Intoxication is now defined
as not having the normal use of mental or physical faculties or having a blood alcohol
concentration of .10% or more. See Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-1((2)(A), (B)
(Vernon Supp. 1991). Section 1192 also uses a .10% blood alcohol concentration level to
define intoxication. N.Y. VEH. & TRAm. LAW § 1192(2) (McKinney 1986) (amended 1988);
see also N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192(2) (McKinney Supp. 1990) (amended version of §
1192 which, inter alia, explicitly defines driving with a blood alcohol level of .10% or
more as "[d]riving while intoxicated: per se."). Johnston was not given a blood alcohol
test.
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2. Johnston Acted with Criminal Negligence
The court of appeals should also have found that Johnston
acted with criminal negligence. Under New York law, criminal
negligence is defined as the failure to perceive a substantial and
unjustifiable risk.7 8 The risk must be such that the failure to
perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of
care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation. 0
It is difficult to see how someone who drives while inebri-
ated to such a degree that her inebriation causes her to kill an-
other has not taken a substantial and unjustifiable riskY' The
risks associated with drinking and driving are well known.
Surely, the failure to perceive those well-known risks and to
drive under such circumstances constitutes a gross deviation
from the standard of care that the "reasonable person" would
observe.
Apparently anticipating this argument, the court, near the
end of its opinion, stated: "It has long been the rule in this State
that proof of intoxication alone is insufficient to establish crimi-
nal negligence. .. ."81 However, in so stating, the court ignored
and misinterpreted prior New York case law.
First, there is significant New York authority which holds
that by virtue of driving while intoxicated, one acts with crimi-
nal negligence.8 2 Second, in stating that intoxication alone is in-
sufficient to establish criminal negligence, the court quoted from
its decision in People v. Bast. 3 The court's reliance on Bast,
78 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05 (McKinney 1987).
79 Id.
60 It is important to remember that the Texas involuntary manslaughter statute, see
note 18 supra, explicitly requires that the defendant's intoxication cause him to kill an-
other. Tx. PNAL CODE ANN. § 19.05 (Vernon 1974) (amended 1987).
81 In re Johnston, 75 N.Y.2d 403, 409-10, 553 N.E.2d 566, 569, 554 N.Y.S.2d 88, 91
(1990) (quoting People v. Bast, 19 N.Y.2d 813, 815, 227 N.E.2d 47, 47, 280 N.Y.S.2d 149,
150 (1967)).
See, e.g., People v. Holt, 109 A.D.2d 174, 176, 491 N.Y.S.2d 526, 528 (4th Dep't
1985) ("Certainly, driving while intoxicated is sufficient evidence of a 'gro3 deviation'
from the required standard of care to permit a jury to find a defendant has acted with
criminal negligence."); People v. Osburn, 155 A.D.2d 926, 928, 547 N.Y.S.2d 749, 751 (4th
Dep't 1989) (same); People v. Rennoldson, 117 A.D.2d 994, 994, 499 N.Y.S.2d 292, 293
(4th Dep't 1986) (same); cf. People v. Daley, 54 A.D.2d 1007, 1008, 388 N.Y.S.2d 359, 361
(3d Dept 1976) (proof that defendant drove while under the influence of marijuana was
sufficient to allow a jury to find that he acted with criminal negligence).
Johnston, 75 N.Y.2d at 409-10, 553 N.E.2d at 569, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 91 (quoting
People v. Bast, 19 N.Y.2d 813, 815, 227 N.E.2d 47, 280 N.Y.S.2d 149, 150 (1987)).
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however, was misplaced. That decision is properly construed as
standing for the more modest proposition that where no causal
connection is established between the defendant's intoxication
and an accident, it cannot be inferred that the defendant acted
with criminal negligence."s Since the Texas statute explicitly re-
quires proof of a causal connection between the defendant's in-
toxication and the death of another,85 a finding of criminal negli-
84 Bast concerned the appeal of a defendant convicted of now-repealed Penal Law §
1053-a, Criminal Negligence in Operation of Vehicle Resulting in Death. The substance
of New York's vehicular manslaughter statute is derived from former Penal Law § 1053-
a, which provided: "A person who operates or drives any vehicle of any kind in a reckless
or culpably negligent manner, whereby a human being is killed, is guilty of criminal neg-
ligence in the operation of a vehicle resulting in death." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1053-a (Mc-
Kinney 1936) (repealed 1965).
The court misinterpreted the decision in Bast. When the Bast court stated that
"[p]roof of intoxication alone is not enough to sustain a conviction of criminal negli-
gence," 19 N.Y.2d 813, 815, 227 N.E.2d 47, 47, 280 N.Y.S.2d 149, 150, it did not state
that proof that one drives while intoxicated is insufficient to show that one acted with
the mens rea of criminal negligence. Rather, the court's statement was a shorthand for
the proposition that proof of intoxication alone is not enough to sustain a conviction of
the crime of criminal negligence in the operation of a vehicle resulting in death (i.e., §
1053-a). This latter interpretation is more logical because the Bast court spoke in terms
of conviction and, after all, one can only be convicted of a crime; one cannot be convicted
of "criminal negligence" in the abstract. Thus, interpreted properly in the context in
which it was made, the court's statement in Bast makes sense. The court merely stated
that one could not be convicted of former Penal Law § 1053-a merely because one killed
another while driving, and one happened to be intoxicated at the time. Rather, in order
for the fact that one was intoxicated to have relevance with respect to the statute, it
must be proved that one's intoxication caused one to act in a reckless or culpably negli-
gent manner and caused one to kill another. See People v. Fink, 18 A.D.2d 220, 225, 238
N.Y.S.2d 847, 852 (3d Dep't 1963) (Bergan, P.J., concurring), upon which the Bast court
relied: "Unless the prosecution is prepared to prove that alcohol had some actual and
adverse effect on the manner in which a vehicle is operated, an expression such as 'while
under the influence of alcohol' should not be included in the indictment or charged to
the jury. . . . [I]f a physical condition of the operator. ., is [to be] germane at all in a
prosecution under section 1053-a of the Penal Law, it must play some effective role in
the occurrence of the accident." See Bast, 19 N.Y.2d at 815, 227 N.E.2d at 47, 280
N.Y.S.2d at 150.
Indeed, quoted more completely and in context, the decision in Bast reads as fol-
lows: "Proof of intoxication alone is not enough to sustain a conviction of [the crime of]
criminal negligence [in the operation of a vehicle resulting in death]. The People must
also prove that the defendant's intoxication affected his physical and mental capacity
to the extent that it caused him to operate his vehicle in a culpably reckless manner.
The evidence adduced by the People failed to establish that defendant drove at an
excessive rate of speed or that his intoxication caused him to strike the decedent." Id.
(citations omitted) (emphasis added). The holding in Bast simply does not stand for the
proposition for which the Johnston court relied upon it.
85 See note 18 supra. See also Daniel v. State, 577 S.W.2d 231, 233 (Tex. Crim. App.
1979).
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gence can properly be found upon conviction under the
statute."" Therefore, the court should have found that the re-
quired showing of criminal negligence under the New York ve-
hicular manslaughter was satisfied.
C. Legislative Intent and the Goals of Attorney Discipline
Section 90(4)(e), which provides that an attorney convicted
of a foreign felony is subject to automatic disbarment only if the
foreign felony would also constitute a felony under New York
law, 7 is the result of an amendment to the statute in 1979.83
Prior to the amendment, the statute merely provided for auto-
matic disbarment upon conviction of a felony, without reference
to whether the offense was committed in New York or in a for-
eign jurisdiction."" In In re Chu 0 and In re Thies,"' the court of
appeals held that an attorney's conviction of any federal felony
was grounds for automatic disbarment under section 90(4). 2 By
" The necessity of proving a causal connection between the defendant's intoxication
and the death of another requires that the jury find that the defendant drove in a sub-
standard manner. See notes 70-71 and accompanying text supra. Thus, a finding that a
defendant acted with criminal negligence is proper upon conviction under the Texas
statute. Choosing to drive while sufficiently drunk so that one's inebriation causes such
substandard driving that it results in the death of another should constitute taking a
substantial and unjustifiable risk sufficient to constitute criminal negligence. Conviction
under the Texas statute requires the jury to find that the defendant drove under just
such circumstances. Therefore, it requires the jury to find that the defendant acted with
criminal negligence. Indeed, this is undoubtedly the precise basis on which Texas courts
have found that conviction under the statute implicitly involves an act of recklessness.
'7 See note 2 supra for the text of § 90(4)(e).
"Attorneys, Counsellors-At-Law-Admission and Removal by Appellate Court Act,
ch. 674, 1979 N.Y. Laws 1306.
"The statute previously provided:
Any person being an attorney and counsellor-at-law, who shall be con-
victed of a felony, shall, upon such conviction, cease to be an attorney or coun-
sellor-at-law, or to be competent to practice law as such.
N.Y. Jun. LAW § 90(4) (McKinney 1968), amended by ch. 674, 1979 N.Y. Laws 1306.
-' 42 N.Y.2d 490, 369 N.E.2d 1, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (1977).
91 45 N.Y.2d 865, 382 N.E.2d 1351, 410 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1978), appeal dismissed, 441
U.S. 939 (1979).
92 The court in Chu stated, "We conclude that conviction of an attorney for criminal
conduct judged by the Congress to be of such seriousness and so offensive to the commu-
nity as to merit punishment as a felony is sufficient ground to invoke automatic disbar-
ment." Chu, 42 N.Y.2d at 493, 369 N.E.2d at 3, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 1003 (citation omitted).
For a thorough discussion of the Chu decision, see notes 46-54 and accompanying text
supra; see also Comment, supra note 46.
The attorney in Thies had been arrested and charged with a federal offense. See
Bonomi, Professional Responsibility, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 14, 1978, at 1, col 1. At arraign-
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its holdings in Chu and Thies, the court of appeals overruled the
construction of section 90(4) that it had authorized thirty-eight
years before in In re Donegan.93 In response, the statute was
amended by the legislature to provide for automatic disbarment
upon conviction of a foreign felony only if the crime would con-
stitute a felony if committed in New York.
The result in Johnston is contrary to the legislature's intent
in amending section 90(4). The legislature, in light of the court's
holdings in Chu and Thies, added section 90(4)(e) because it
was concerned that conviction of a minor offense in a foreign
jurisdiction would result in automatic disbarment in New
York.94 However, involuntary manslaughter cannot reasonably
ment, the magistrate dismissed the complaint as insufficient. Thies erroneously believed
that the arrest was unlawful and that he was free to go. When federal agents attempted
to prevent him from leaving the courthouse, a shouting and pushing match ensued. Dur-
ing the scuffle, an agent suffered a bruised thumb. Thies was charged and convicted of
assault on a federal officer, 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1988), a felony under federal law. As a result,
he was automatically disbarred. Bonomi, supra, at 1; see also Note, supra note 13, at
618.
Three judges dissented from the court's opinion in Thies, finding, as they had in the
concurring opinion in Chu, see note 53 supra, that the extension of § 90(4) to all federal
felony convictions was unwarranted. They stated that "[tihe aberrational results which
today's determination will bring may now be avoided only by legislative action." Thies,
45 N.Y.2d at 867, 382 N.E.2d at 1352, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 577 (Wachtler, Fuchsberg, and
Cooke JJ., dissenting from per curiam opinion).
93 282 N.Y. 285, 26 N.E.2d 260 (1940). In Donegan, the court held that a felony
conviction in a foreign jurisdiction would not warrant automatic disbarment unless the
foreign felony was "cognizable" as a felony under New York law. Id. at 292, 26 N.E.2d at
263. For a more thorough discussion of the court's decision in Donegan, see note 94
infra.
It is interesting to note that before Donegan, it was the general practice of New
York courts to invoke automatic disbarment for any foreign felony conviction. Note,
supra note 13, at 617 n.100.
9' Governor's Mem. of Approval, Attorneys, Counsellors-At-Law-Admission and
Removal by Appellate Court, ch. 674, 1979 N.Y. Laws 1306, 1822 ("Valid concerns have
been raised that the Chu and Thies decisions could result in the automatic disbarment of
an attorney upon conviction of a relatively minor offense merely because it is denomi-
nated as a felony in the jurisdiction where the offense occurred. The bill deals with this
issue by eliminating automatic disbarment for the commission of a felony which is not a
felony under the laws of this State."); see also Bill Jacket, Legislation Report # 121 of
the Committee on Professional Discipline of the New York State Bar Association, 1979
(condemning automatic disbarment "for conduct which constitutes, for example, a minor
offense or a mere technical violation").
The lack of recorded legislative history makes it difficult to assess the legislature's
intent in passing 1979 N.Y. Laws 674. However, an examination of the bill jacket and the
context in which the amendment was passed suggests that it was not the intention of the
legislature that a conviction of involuntary manslaughter in Texas be considered a minor
offense from which an attorney deserves protection from automatic disbarment.
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First, it is clear that the legislature intended expressly to overrule the court of ap-
peals's holdings in Chu and Thies. See Governor's Mem. of Approval, 1979 N.Y. Laws
674 at 1822; see also Bill Jacket, Legislation Report #121 of the Committee on Profes-
sional Discipline of the New York State Bar Association, 1979 ("The Cooperman bill,
Assembly No. 6252-A... accomplishes repeal of Matter of Chu, which requires auto-
matic disbarment of attorneys convicted under the federal law even though the same
conduct would have constituted only a misdemeanor. .. .") (citation omitted). It also
appears that the legislature approved of the court's holding in In re Donegan and of the
result reached in that case. See A. 6252-A, 1979-1980 Reg. Sess. ("Section 90(4) of the
Judiciary Law provides for automatic disbarment upon conviction of a 'felony.' In Mat-
ter of Donegan, 'felony' was interpreted as a New York State felony or a foreign felony
cognizable as a felony under New York law. In 1977 the Court of Appeals in Matter of
Chu changed this.. .") (citations omitted).
The attorney in Donegan was convicted under federal conspiracy law. In re Done-
gan, 282 N.Y. 285, 287, 26 N.E.2d 260, 261 (1940). In New York at that time, conspiracy
to commit any crime constituted only a misdemeanor. Id. The Donegan court held that
Donegan was not subject to automatic disbarment because the federal offense was not
"cognizable" as a felony under New York law. Id. at 292, 26 N.E.2d at 263. Under Done-
gan, therefore, an attorney was not subject to automatic disbarment under § 90(4) when
there existed a New York State offense that was clearly analogous to the foreign felony
of which the attorney had been convicted, but the analogous New York offense had been
deemed to constitute merely a misdemeanor. Since the legislature approved of and
amended § 90(4) against the background of the result in Donegan, it is reasonable to
infer that a result contrary to that in Donegan is what it wanted to prevent. That is, the
legislature intended to prevent the automatic disbarment of an attorney convicted of a
foreign felony whose New York analogue it had already denominated a misdemeanor
because, although an analogous New York offense clearly exists, the legislature had al-
ready considered it and deemed it to be minor.
Such an intent on the part of the legislature makes sense. Situations such as that
which confronted the court in Donegan are unavoidable. It is inevitable that a court will
occasionally be presented with a case where a foreign offense and a New York offense are
perfectly analogous-indeed, where the conduct at issue (e.g., conspiracy to commit a
felony) is universally recognized as criminal-but where one jurisdiction has decided that
the conduct constitutes a felony while the other has decided that it constitutes only a
misdemeanor. The New York legislature's denomination of the level of the offense sim-
ply reflects its value judgment regarding the seriousness of the crime. It is that value
judgment, reflected in the denomination of the offense as a felony or a misdemeanor, to
which New York attorneys are held accountable.
Section 90(4) was amended also in response to the court's decision in Thies, and it is
logical to believe that the legislature intended to prevent results such as the result in
Thies. The foreign felony at issue in Thies was assault upon a federal officer. In that
case, unlike in Donegan, no analogous New York offense existed, because an integral
element of what makes the conduct that constitutes the federal felony seriously offensive
(i.e., assault upon a federal officer) is peculiar to the foreign jurisdiction. See also Bill
Jacket, Legislation Report #121 of the Committee on Professional Discipline of the New
York State Bar Association, 1979 (condemning the holding in Chu because it would re-
sult in disbarment when the federal felony was defacement of a coin. 18 U.S.C. § 331
(1988)).
Like its approval of the result in Donegan, the legislature's disapproval of the result
in Thies is similarly sensible. Situations such as that which confronted the Thies court
are also inevitable. For certain foreign felony offenses (e.g., assault on a federal officer or
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be considered a minor offense.9 5 The facts in Johnston do not
present a case where an analogous New York offense exists, but
only constitutes a misdemeanor in New York."' Nor is it a case
where no analogous New York offense exists because the foreign
felony is composed of conduct the offensive nature of which is
peculiar to the jurisdiction in which it is committed.9 7 On the
contrary, taking the life of another because one drove after
drinking is universally condemned. The construction given sec-
tion 90(4) by the court of appeals in Johnston results in the con-
clusion that Johnston's commission of involuntary manslaughter
in Texas would not constitute even a misdemeanor were it com-
mitted in New York."8 Such a construction gives the 1979
amendment an overly broad effect and hinders the effectuation
of the legislature's intent.
The decision in Johnston is also logically inconsistent with
the general purpose of section 90(4) because it is inconsistent
with the goals that underlie attorney discipline. One of the pri-
mary reasons attorney discipline is imposed is to protect the
public image of the bar. 9 The public is ill-served by a profession
defacement of a coin) there simply will not exist any truly analogous New York crime,
because the conduct at issue is considered seriously offensive for reasons peculiar to the
jurisdiction that has criminalized it. In contrast to the situation in Donegan, the relevant
conduct at issue in such cases is not universally recognized as criminal; rather, the for-
eign felony offense is, in essence, malum prohibitum. Because such offenses generally
crininalize conduct for reasons peculiar to a particular jurisdiciton, it is quite unlikely
that the New York leglislature ever even thought of punishing such conduct. Therefore,
because New York attorneys are accountable to the value judgments of the New York
legislature regarding what constitutes seriously offensive conduct (as expressed in the
criminal statutes enacted by it), automatic disbarment upon conviction of such foreign
felonies would be inappropriate.
" See note 94 supra.
9 See the discussion of In re Donegan in note 94 supra.
9 See the discussion of In re Thies in note 94 supra.
98 According to the court's analysis, see text accompanying notes 30-39 supra, the
most it could find is that Johnston drove while impaired, a traffic violation. N.Y. VEn, &
TRAF. LAW § 1192 (McKinney 1986) (amended 1988); see note 21 supra.
" See C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 82 (1986) ("Members of the public may
reasonably conclude, if the lawyer's conduct is unchecked, that lack of competence or
character typifies lawyers generally. Unless discipline is effectively imposed, the policy of
protection of the bar will be distorted into a practice of protecting offending members of
the bar against the embarrassment and inconvenience of professional discipline. .... );
see also Note, Disbarment: Non-Professional Conduct Demonstrating Unfitness to
Practice, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 489 (1958); Note, supra note 13, at 606; Comment, Disbar-
ment - Felony Conviction, 21 ALB. L. REv. 100, 102 (1957).
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the integrity and character of whose members it questions. 1°0
Many of society's most important economic, social, and political
conflicts are resolved through the legal system.10 1 It is therefore
essential that the public believe in the integrity of the legal sys-
tem and perceive lawyers as honest, trustworthy, and possessed
of high moral standards.10 2 Allowing convicted felons to continue
to practice law denigrates the image of the bar in the eyes of the
public.10 3
Moreover, the court's decision will have a negative impact
generally on the disciplinary system in New York. More cases
Will require a hearing and subsequent determination by the ap-
pellate division.10 Each such hearing and determination will re-
quire the participation of the state's disciplinary and grievance
committees, which are already severely overburdened and
understaffed.10 5
11 See, e.g., United States v. Jennings, 724 F.2d 436, 449 (5th Cir. 1984) (discussing
need to uphold public confidence in the bar); In re Mitchell, 40 N.Y.2d 153, 156-57, 351
N.E.2d 743, 745-46, 386 N.Y.S.2d 95, 97 (1976) (stating that public confidence is neces-
sary for the effective administration of the legal system); Gentile & McShea, Automatic
Disbarment: A Convicted Felon's Just Desserts, 13 HASnINGS CONST. LQ. 433, 441 (1986)
("The public's trust in the honesty and integrity of lawyers is absolutely critical to the
legal profession's ability to assist in the resolution of conflicts and the dispensation of
justice.").
" Gentile & McShea, supra, note 100, at 440.
102 Id.
Mo See, e.g., In re Stoner, 507 F. Supp. 490, 492 (N.D. Ga. 1981) ("[Tihe fact that
the attorney is a 'convicted felon'.. . tends to impair public confidence in the judicial
system and the integrity of the bar as a whole."); In re Mitchell, 40 N.Y.2d 153, 156, 351
N.E.2d 743, 745, 386 N.Y.S.2d 95, 97 (1976) ("To permit a convicted felon to continue to
appear in our courts... would not 'advance the ends of justice', but instead would
invite scorn and disrespect for our rule of law.").
Of course, by amending § 90(4) to provide that not every foreign felony conviction
will result in automatic disbarment, the legislature obviously contemplated that some
attorneys convicted of felonies would continue to practice law. However, the legislature
intended to prevent automatic disbarment as a result of the conviction of a minor of-
fense in a foreign jurisdiction which happened to be denominated a felony. See note 94
supra. The amendment is, therefore, consistent with the goal of protecting the reputa-
tion of the bar because the adverse effect on the bar's public image when an attorney is
convicted of a minor offense (e.g., defacement of a coin) is likely to be insignificant.
'o' See note 7 supra.
100 An examination of the DDC's caseload and its disposition is illustrative. The
state's disciplinary committees handled a record number of new matters in 1989, 12355,
which represented a significant increase over the 11,825 new matters handled in 1988,
also a record. Fox, 48 New York Lawyers Disbarred Last Year, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 29, 1990,
at 1, col. 3. Of the 12,355 new matters filed, 5,278 were handled by the DDC. Id. The
staff of the DDC, responsible for the investigation and prosecution of all complaints
against attorneys in the first department, is composed of only 13 members. Wise, Disci-
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CONCLUSION
The Johnston court broke with precedent, imposing an un-
duly narrow construction on section 90(4) of New York's Judici-
ary Law. The court now requires that when an attorney is con-
victed of a felony under the law of another jurisdiction there be
a strict identity of elements between the felony of which the at-
torney is convicted and a New York felony offense. This strict
standard allows an attorney to escape disbarment under the
statute by relying on hyper-technical distinctions between stat-
utes enacted in New York and those enacted in other
jurisdictions.
Attorney misconduct continues to be a growing problem in
New York. The legal system can only function effectively if er-
rant attorneys are effectively disciplined by the courts. Allowing
attorneys convicted of serious offenses to continue to practice
law undermines public confidence in the bar. Imposing on New
York's courts and disciplinary committees the burden of an in-
creased number of disciplinary proceedings lessens the effective-
ness and increases the cost of attorney discipline. The Johnston
decision is inconsistent with the intent of the legislature and
with the goals of attorney discipline.
David Weinreb
plinary Caseload Continues to Mount, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 8, 1989, at 1, col. 3.
In 1989, the DDC received approximately 1,422 new complaints against attorneys
each quarter, an increase of 9.4% over the quarterly average of 1,300 in 1988. Id. An
analysis of the DDC's handling of cases shows a concomitant increase in the number of
cases disposed of without the more time-consuming process of a disciplinary hearing and
subsequent recommendation to the appellate division, which must approve and impose
any recommendation for a formal sanction, see note 7 supra, such as censure, suspen-
sion, or disbarment. Wise, supra at 1. The number of cases dismissed after investigation
rose by 12%. Id. In addition, the number of letters of caution and admonitions, actions
which the DDC can take on its own, see note 7 supra, rose 67% and 31% respectively
during the first three quarters of 1989. Wise, supra at 1. At the same time, the number of
cases referred to the appellate division with a recommendation of public sanction
dropped by 67%.
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